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First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Commissioner, 921 F.2d 1081
Author: Judge Anderson
In a complicated transaction in 1979, plaintiff, First National Bank
in Albuquerque ("Bank"), sold its old office building to a real estate
partnership. This partnership then conveyed the property to the City of
Albuquerque ("City"), who then leased it back. The City issued redevel-
opment bonds to finance the renovation of the old bank building, and
the real estate partnership's lease payments were equivalent to amount
of the bond. The Bank elected to treat the sale of the property as an
installment sale. In 1980, the Bank received cash from the bond money
that satisfied the debt owed to the Bank by the real estate partnership.
Defendant, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue ("Commissioner"),
after an audit, determined that the Bank disposed of its installment obli-
gations after the City provided the bond money, and increased the
Bank's taxable income by $1,062,000. The tax court found in favor of
the Commissioner, and the Bank appealed.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the tax court, saying that the bonds were
in the nature of a commercial loan, and afortiori do not qualify for in-
stallment sale treatment. The Bank was paid with the cash from the
bond proceeds, which terminated the installment sale and caused the
Bank to realize taxable income.
United-States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Collins, was convicted by a jury on three counts of fed-
eral income tax evasion. Collins claimed that the jury was improperly
instructed on good faith, which was one of the necessary elements of the
charge, and that his sixth amendment right to counsel was violated when
the district court revoked the pro hac vice of his privately retained
counsel.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction. First, the court held that
the instructions given to the jury were unambiguous and proper. Sec-
ond, the court stated that no procedural due process violation occurred,
because Collins was given notice and an opportunity to show cause why
his attorney's pro hac vice status should not be revoked. Finally, the court
reviewed the pleadings submitted by Collins' attorney and upheld the
revocation of the pro hac vice status. The court affirmed that the public
interest in maintaining and conducting an orderly trial outweighed Col-
lins' right to the counsel of his choice.
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Dillingham v. Commissioner, 903 F.2d 760
Author: Judge Brorby
The estate of Dillingham ("Dillingham") appealed the decision of
the tax court which held that the estate was subject to a statutory notice
of deficiency in estate taxes. On appeal, Dillingham argued that:
(1) the tax court should have imposed the burden of proof on the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue ("Commissioner") to demonstrate the
applicability of the six-year statute of limitations of I.R.C. § 6501(e)(2)
rather than the expired three-year limitation of I.R.C. § 6501 (a)(2); and
(2) the Commissioner failed to sustain the burden of proof.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the tax court's decision. The court
found that the Commissioner had the burden to establish that the alter-
nate six year statute of limitation period applied rather than the expired
three-year period. The court, however, also found that the Commis-
sioner met his burden by establishing that Dillingham had "dominion
and control" over the disputed checks. Finally, the court declined to
apply the "relation back doctrine" to this situation of noncharitable
gifts.
Faber v. United States, 921 F.2d 1118
Author: Judge Tacha
The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") served a third party sum-
mons on American Savings, requesting bank records held in the name of
plaintiff, Faber. The district court dismissed Faber's petition to quash
the summons. On appeal, Faber argued the district court erred in dis-
missing his motion because the form of the summons was invalid and,
therefore, it could not initiate the twenty-day limit on a motion to quash.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the district court properly dismissed
Faber's motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained
that a taxpayer's motion to quash an IRS's third party summons must be
filed within twenty days from the date notice is sent or personally served.
Faber, however, failed to file his motion within the twenty-day time pe-
riod. Moreover, since there was no basis for jurisdiction, the court did
not reach the merits of Faber's claim that the summons was invalid.
United States v. Hallmark, 911 F.2d 399
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Hallmark, was convicted of twelve counts of willfully fal-
sifying tax returns relating to his wagering activity in violation of 26
U.S.C. § 7206(1). Hallmark appealed, arguing that: (1) the federal ex-
cise tax on wagering is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' enu-
merated powers; (2) the statute authorizing the use of pen registers or
trap and trace devices is unconstitutional, and evidence gathered against
him by means of such a device is, therefore, inadmissible; and (3) the
evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support the jury's guilty
verdict.
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The Tenth Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court found the
federal excise tax on wagering activity is a constitutional exercise of
Congress' power to lay and collect taxes. Moreover, the court noted
that the Supreme Court previously rejected the argument that the tenth
amendment restricts Congress' power to tax. In addition, the constitu-
tional requirement of uniformity was not violated because the tax ap-
plies uniformly to the states. Second, the court held that installation and
use of a pen register and trap and trace device is not a search requiring a
warrant pursuant to the fourth amendment. Furthermore, the court's
approval of using this device did not harm Hallmark. Finally, the court
found overwhelming evidence in the record to support Hallmark's
conviction.
Hurst v. United States Dep't of Educ., 901 F.2d 836
Per Curiam
Defendant, Department of Education ("DOED"), filed a counter-
claim against plaintiff, Hurst, for the balance due on her defaulted stu-
dent loan. The district court granted Hurst's motion for summary
judgment, and DOED subsequently appealed. DOED asserted that its
claim was still viable because the six year statute of limitations to enforce
student loan obligations is not applicable to counterclaims in litigation
brought by the debtor.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court ruled that the six year statute of limitations precluded DOED from
asserting a counterclaim for the loan balance. The court explained that
under principles of federal limitations law, a counterclaim for affirmative
relief is subject to the operation of pertinent statues of limitation. The
court also ruled that other federal laws expressly make an exception to
the statute of limitations for counterclaims. The governing statute for
recovery of student loans, however, does not make such an exception.
20 U.S.C. § 1091(a). Moreover, no exception shall be constructively
read into the statute. The court also indicated that the Internal Revenue
Service may use its administrative offset remedy to legally enforce stu-
dent debt beyond the six year period because such actions are not
DOED legal proceedings.
James v. Commissioner, 899 F.2d 905
Author: Judge Logan
Defendants were investors in joint ventures that purchased com-
puter systems already leased to industrial corporations. The investors
took deductions on their personal income tax returns for depreciation
and for fees to the seller. Moreover, they took investment tax credits for
the purchase of the computer systems. Plaintiff, Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue, disallowed the credits and deductions, finding that the
transactions had no basis except for tax reduction. The tax court unani-
mously agreed, and the investors appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding the computer investments to
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be "shams," lacking in economic substance. The court explained that
no pre-tax profit could reasonably have been expected from the
purchase. Moreover, the court found that the net result of the various
agreements between the seller and joint venturers was to keep the joint
venturers at the break-even point. Accordingly, the venturers merely
purchased tax benefits, not true ownership. Since the only practical eco-
nomic effect of the transactions was the creation of tax losses, the court
held the tax court's conclusions reasonable. Thus, the decision of the
tax court was affirmed.
Jefferson Bank and Trust v. United States, 894 F.2d 1241
Author: Judge Bohanon, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Jefferson Bank and Trust (the "Bank"), brought suit for
wrongful levy to secure the return of $93,880, which was paid to the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). The district court granted summary
judgment for the Bank and the United States appealed. On appeal, the
government contended that the Bank had a pei-fected security interest in
the taxpayer's checking accounts, and that the Bank's interests were
choate at the time the IRS filed its tax liens.
On de novo review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's
judgment. The court concluded that a perfected security interest was
created under common law because title to the taxpayer's deposit was
transferred to the bank. This, in turn, created an assignment, which,
according to the court, is a security interest protected under local law.
Second, the court ruled that the amount of the Bank's lien against the
account was established and definite at the time the government filed its
tax lien. Therefore, the Bank's security interest was choate at the time
the tax lien was filed. Furthermore, the Bank's interest was "first in
time" and, therefore, prevailed over the government's interest. Accord-
ingly, summary judgment was proper.
Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiffs, Eugene and Patsy Lonsdale, commenced this suit against
the United States seeking to prevent Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
levies on their wages and a credit union account for unpaid income
taxes. On appeal, they argued: (1) the government had no power to tax
wages and, therefore, lacked the right to collect unpaid income taxes;
(2) the IRS had no power to impose levies because Treasury Depart-
ment orders delegating such power were not published in the Federal
Register; and (3) the IRS forms did not satisfy the requirements of the
Paperwork Reduction Act.
First, the Tenth Circuit held that this suit was barred by the Anti-
Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (a), which states no suit for the purpose
of restraining the collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court.
Furthermore, the court rejected the Lonsdales' attempt to frame their
contest as a quiet title action in order to garner jurisdiction under 28
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U.S.C. § 2410. In addition, none of the general jurisdiction statutes
cited by the Lonsdales waived the government's sovereign immunity.
The court explained that the taxpayer must find an explicit waiver of
sovereign immunity. Second, the court held that the Administrative
Procedures Act does not require that the Treasury Department orders
be published in the Federal Register. Accordingly, the court held the
Lonsdales' publication arguments to be meritless. Finally, the court
ruled that any alleged failure to comply with the Paperwork Reduction
Act provides no basis for avoiding the levies imposed on the Lonsdales.
City Vending of Muskogee, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 898 F.2d 122
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, City Vending of Muskogee, Incorporated ("CVM"), chal-
lenged two tax assessments imposed by the Oklahoma Tax Commission
("OTC"). The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to
consider CVM's claims. The district court reasoned that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1341 precluded its review of the state tax assessments. CVM subse-
quently appealed. Specifically, CVM argued that since the OTC held
that it did not have authority to determine the constitutional issues as-
serted, and since no other court considered the merits of CVM's consti-
tutional challenges, no tribunal of competent jurisdiction adjudicated
the constitutionality of the initial state tax assessment. Thus, CVM ar-
gued that the district court should have addressed the issue. OTC, on
the other hand, argued that since no state court addressed CVM's con-
stitutional claims, CVM was bound by OTC's determination.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination. The
court found that ordinarily, § 1341 precludes a federal court from deter-
mining tax assessments under state law where state courts are available
to make such determinations. Section 1341, however, does not preclude
such a determination where federal courts have jurisdiction under the
bankruptcy code. This is true unless the amount and legality of the tax
was contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tri-
bunal. The court also acknowledged that in the context of a bankruptcy
proceeding, a federal court may have jurisdiction to review a state tax
assessment where the taxpayer failed to pursue state remedies. Two
policies support federal court jurisdiction in state tax matters:
(1) prompt resolution of a debtor's tax liability, where that liability has
not been determined prior to bankruptcy proceedings; and (2) protec-
tion of creditors from the dissipation of the estate when the debtor fails
to challenge the assessment before commencing bankruptcy or where
the debtor challenges the assessment through state proceedings which
have not been decided at the time bankruptcy is filed. The court then
ruled that OTC's first tax assessment was not void because CVM's con-
stitutional claims were not addressed. Thus, OTC did not act beyond
the scope of its jurisdiction. In the second tax assessment, however,
OTC did address the constitutional claim, and CVM did not pursue re-
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view. Accordingly, the judgment was final under Oklahoma law, prior to
commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Commissioner, 914 F.2d 1417
Author: Judge Seymour
During the annual "Final Four Tournament," defendant, National
Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"), contracted to publish a pro-
gram which included a substantial amount of advertising. NCAA re-
ceived a percentage of the net revenues from sales of the program.
Plaintiff, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charged that the money re-
ceived was unrelated business taxable income and sued for taxes owed.
The tax court ruled that the revenue was unrelated business taxable in-
come, not excluded from tax as a royalty.
On de novo review, the Tenth Circuit reversed. In determining
whether revenue was unrelated business taxable income, the court ap-
plied a statutory three part test: (1) income from a trade or business;
(2) regularly carried on by the organization; and (3) not substantially
related to the organization's exempt functions. NCAA conceded that its
program advertising was a trade or business not substantially related to
its exempt purpose. Consequently, the only question remaining was
whether the trade or business was regularly carried on by the NCAA. In
deciding this question, the court's first step was to consider the normal
time span of the activity. The court concluded that the tournament must
be considered the actual time span of the business activity sought to be
taxed. Accordingly, since the tournament lasted only a few weeks, it did
not constitute the regular carrying on of a trade or business. The court,
however, stated that its analysis was not finished. It was required to de-
termine whether activities which are intermittently conducted are never-
theless regularly carried on by virtue of the manner in which they are
pursued. The court concluded that the advertising was sufficiently infre-
quent to preclude a determination that the NCAA's administrative busi-
ness was regularly carried on. Thus, the revenues were not unrelated
business taxable income.
Schmidt v. King, 913 F.2d 837
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Schmidt, brought a quiet title action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2410 against defendants, United States and Internal Revenue Service
("IRS"). Schmidt sought damages for the IRS's assessment and collec-
tion of taxes, and seizure and sale of his property. He also sought in-
junctive and declaratory relief to prevent future collection activities.
The district court denied the IRS's motion for summary judgment, hold-
ing that it had jurisdiction over Schmidt's claim of improper notice and
demand requisite to a valid tax lien. The district court held that there
was proper notice, and Schmidt appealed on the merits.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the action. The court reasoned that although § 2410 waives
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the United States' sovereign immunity for quiet title actions, the waiver
does not apply when such actions seek to collaterally attack the merits of
a tax assessment.
Security Pacific Mortgage Corp. v. Choate, 897 F.2d 1057
Author: Judge Bohanon, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Security Pacific Mortgage Corporation ("Security Pacific"),
appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor
of defendant, United States. Several tax liens existed on the subject
property, and Security Pacific instituted public trustee foreclosure pro-
ceedings on that property without giving notice to the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS"). Security Pacific argued that its failure to give notice to
the IRS did not extinguish its lien.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded. In Colorado, the intent
to preserve a lien is controlling. If that intent is not express, it will be
inferred by the court. The court, applying Colorado law, inferred that
Security Pacific did not intend its lien to be extinguished. Therefore,
Security Pacific's lien retained its priority over the federal tax lien.
Tavery v. United States, 897 F.2d 1032
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Tavery, appealed the district court's partial grant of
summary judgment for the government. The district court based its de-
cision on the theory of collateral estoppel. Moreover, Tavery appealed
the dismissal of the remainder of her complaint seeking refund of in-
come taxes paid. On appeal, Tavery argued she was not in privy with
her husband for purposes of applying resjudicata and collateral estoppel in
litigation concerning their joint and several income tax liability. Fur-
thermore, Tavery argued that the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") can-
not issue separate notices of deficiency to spouses who have filed joint
returns.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision on two al-
ternate grounds. First, the court ruled that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel could not apply. The court reasoned that it previously vacated
the tax court's decision concerning the husband's liability. Since this
decision considered the same issues for which Tavery sought relief,
there could be no collateral estoppel. Alternatively, the court held that
tax claims against spouses who file a joint tax return are separate and
distinct for resjudicata purposes. Finally, the IRS may issue separate no-
tices of deficiency to spouses who have filed a joint return.
Woodbury v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 1457
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, found that defendant,
Woodbury, had tax deficiencies. The tax court denied Woodbury's peti-
tion for review, and Woodbury appealed. Specifically, Woodbury ar-
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gued that his election to use the fifty percent method in calculating his
charitable contribution deduction was invalid. Thus, he argued he was
not bound by his initial calculation. In the alternative, Woodbury ar-
gued his decision to employ the fifty percent method was revocable.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that Woodbury made a valid election to use
the fifty percent method. The court explained that Woodbury substan-
tially complied with the election requirements. In particular, Woodbury
provided a supplemental worksheet to his tax return which clearly and
unambiguously indicated his charitable contribution deduction was cal-
culated pursuant to the fifty percent method. Furthermore, Woodbury
was not entitled to revoke his election simply because the fifty percent
method was less financially advantageous than another method.
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Wyandotte Tribe, 919 F.2d 1449
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Oklahoma Tax Commission ("Commission"), originally
filed suit in state district court to enjoin defendant, Wyandotte Tribe of
Oklahoma ("Tribe"), from operating a convenience store on tribal
property until the Tribe paid state taxes. The Tribe filed suit in federal
district court to enjoin the enforcement of state tax laws. The state
court action was removed to federal court, and the cases were consoli-
dated for trial. When the Tribe moved to dismiss its federal court ac-
tion, the Commission moved to remand the remaining state action back
to state court. The district court denied both motions. On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit held that the Tribe's motion to dismiss its federal court
action should be granted and then remanded the Commission's action
to the district court. The Commission again moved to remand back to
state court, and the Tribe moved to dismiss based on sovereign immu-
nity. The district court refused remand and granted the Tribe's motion
for dismissal. The Commission appealed the denial of its motion to re-
mand the action to state court for lack of federal jurisdiction. In the
alternative, the Commission appealed the district court's dismissal of the
case based on the court's finding that the Tribe was immune from suit.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, denying the
Commission's motion to remand to state court. Absent express authori-
zation from Congress, an action brought in state court may not be re-
moved to federal court unless the action may have been brought there
originally. The court held that the issue of Indian taxation did not pres-
ent a substantial federal question because the Commission's claim of
right to tax the Tribe arose under state law. The court further held that
a tribal immunity defense does not convert a suit arising under state law
into one which arises under federal law. Concluding that the district
court did not have jurisdiction over the suit, the court vacated the judg-
ment dismissing the action, and remanded to the district court with di-
rections to remand the case to the state court.
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